Self Determination from Barcelona to Balaclava

Self Determination Series 002.

Originally posted on Facebook 22 Sep 2017

Madrid has chosen the Maoist 'political power comes from the barrel of a gun' approach, rather than try to win the hearts and minds of Catalonia. It is a useful reminder that force mobilised to 'protect territorial integrity', is seldom compatible with democratic self determination.

Those that like governments to have power often characterise them as needed to provide things (.Street lighting, fire services, etc ) that are necessary but which would not be done if left to individuals each pursuing their personal interest. This optimistic model of collective endeavour would not be recognised by those finding themselves under attack or enslavement by their government: such as the people of the Congo when ruled by the Belgians, the Karen & Kachin hill tribes in Burma, Tutsis in 1990s Rwanda, protestants during the reign of Mary Tudor, shiites in Saudi Arabia, Tibetans under Chinese occupation, and, arguably, Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland during the troubles (particularly those in nationalist-majority areas).

Government as something done to a people, rather than by it, or for it, is a common feature of empires, dictatorships, and absolute monarchies: Democracy's absence is usual but its presence is not a sufficient condition to prevent such abuse. Ethnic, political, and religious minorities can be oppressed by an intolerant majority. If ISIS had been elected in Iraq, their murder and enslavement of Yazidis would be no less evil.

For democracy to work, and have any hope of making government an accountable servant of the people, there must be a coherent demos: a people that feel enough in common with each other, and have confidence in the fairness of the system, so that, when outvoted, they accept being ruled by politicians voted in by their compatriots. Before devolution, when Scotland was ruled through the 1980s by Tories elected by the English, increasing numbers of Scots began to back secession. Interestingly, although the Tories got more votes than Labour in England in the 2005 election, few English people questioned the mandate of the Blair government to rule them. In the USA the electoral college, which sometimes denies the presidency to the candidate with the most popular votes, de-legitimises the mandate in the eyes of some citizens.

Ukraine is an interesting example. The country had a broad east-west divide, and in 2004 the presidential election produced a victor from the (Russia-leaning) east. The Orange Revolution, centred on Kiev (in Western Ukraine) protested that the vote had been rigged, and achieved success when the Supreme Court ordered a re-run of the election which lead to an 'Orange' (US-EU leaning) victor in 2005 whose mandate was generally accepted throughout the country. The new government was not entirely corruption-free, and lost power in 2010 when the election was won by parties from the east. The result was initially accepted by those in Kiev and western Ukraine, but, after it enacted constitutional changes, and recognised Russian as a regional language useable by government, and jailed Orange ex-PM tymoshenko, some in Western Ukraine ceased to accept its legitimacy, and, in 2014 the 'Euromaiden revolution' toppled the regime. Many residents of Kiev were simply unprepared to be ruled by a Russia-leaning president pursuing policies that lacked popular support in the west. The issue was not that the 2010 election had been stolen, but Ukrainian nationalists being unprepared to be outvoted by Russian speakers in the East, or, at least, not prepared to accept it when the loss meant policies they disliked. They started to see government as being done to them, by an alien Eastern force. Unsurprisingly, many in the East wanted to secede when 'their' democratically elected man was ousted: if Kiev won't accept an easterner, why should Donbas accept a westerner? The inhabitants of Ukraine had ceased to have enough in common to be a coherent & viable demos. This point was reinforced when the new Kiev government pursued 'territorial integrity' by using artillery & bombing the houses & population of Donbas. If Brighton council declared independence, Westminster might refuse to recognise the administration, but it is inconceivable that they would bomb streets containing civilians in Brighton & Hove. Regard for those citizens would prevent such measures. In Ukraine, the new Kiev government had no such regard for citizens in areas that were largely Russian speaking and Russophile. The fracture of Ukraine should not have been a surprise. Stalin having engineered the 1932-33 Holodomor, killing 7-10 million Ukrainians by deliberate famine, it is, perhaps, more surprising that, on the dissolution of the USSR, until 2014, Kiev and Western Ukraine accepted Russian votes ever giving them a Russia-aligned government.

The issues of demos, identity, and consent, seem central to many of today's problems of both sides of the Atlantic.

In Europe, the Brexit vote was largely because the British do no want to be ruled from the continent. When the House of Commons wanted to remove tax on sanitary products, or on carbon-cutting home insulation, but was thwarted by Brussels, it seemed wrong to us.

With the UK leaving the EU, and thus ending its traditional role as a brake on the federalising project, the continental members can choose to pursue further integration. That seems to be what the political elites want, but will the UK's exit just empower them to run ever further from the wishes of their constituents? It is very difficult to see the federalising project succeed unless there is full fiscal integration with rich areas (Germany) sending hundreds of billions to the poorer areas. West Germany was prepared to make vast fiscal transfers to re-unite with east Germany, because the west Germans had a very strong sense of fellowship with the East Germans. There was little sense of 'us' subsidising 'them'. If the German people are inclined to a similar generosity when it comes to the Euro-austerity afflicted poorer Southern European countries, then the European project might work as a sort of inverted empire run and financed by Germany ('inverted' because most empires in history have extracted wealth from the periphery and sent it to the imperial capital, rather than disbursing it from the capital to the colonised states).

It might work, but might well fail, despite fiscal transfers, because, in the long run, people tend to prefer self determination. And, because, those at the centre of an empire come to think that their power is so self-evidently right, that wayward areas should be brought to heel. They see opposition to the centre as evidence of a fault in the province, rather than a symptom of the centre having erred. As a result, they fail to reform themselves.

Cameron is a Europhile, and would have won the referendum had Brussels showed any flexibility. Instead they saw Cameron's job as keeping the British people in line with a Brussels agenda carved in stone. In Spain, the Madrid government has refused to talk to Catalonia's politicians who sought talks about greater regional independence. Instead, the sea outside Barcelona contains ships with 16,000 troops/police to show that Madrid will use force to prevent Catalans voting in an independence referendum. If Alex Salmond is watching, he must be wishing that the Westminster government had managed such a maladroit handling of his Scottish independence movement. Although my family have not lived in Scotland for a couple of generations, I have no doubt that English forces marshalled just south of Hadrian's wall would have prompted a solid majority of Scots to vote for secession.

I suspect today's events will ensure a reversal of the opinion polls that, hitherto, have consistently showed most Catalans wanting to remain part of Spain. Indian nationalism was hardly sweeping the country before General Dyer's 1919 Amritsar massacre made independence almost inevitable. Dyer, with his fifty soldiers, shattered the argument that British rule was benign.

Madrid has highlighted the fact it sees Catalonia as a possession rather than an area where its writ is derived from popular support. Thus its legitimacy withers, no one in Madrid even attempts the reforms that might make Catalans want to remain. And the Gods of the Copybook Headings limp up to explain it once more ...